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Abstract: The naval politics o f Sparta in the period between the Corinthian and Boeotian Wars 
is a problem that barely features in modern studies on classical Greek history. The article tries to 
partially fill this gap, through analysis of the scant sources. The author argues that Sparta did not 
withdraw completely from maintaining its own presence in the Aegean Sea after conclusion o f the 
K ing’s Peace. From the few testimonies, especially o f Xenophon and Polyaenus, we can conclude 
that Sparta even kept a fleet (albeit small) in this period. This means that some kind of influence 
on insular poleis could have been exerted. Possible examples of Spartan actions, like on Thasos, 
are also disputed. However, all bridgeheads in the Aegean that Sparta probably had were lost in 
the first phase of the Boeotian War. This puts into question the quality o f Lacedaemonian leader­
ship, in terms of both political and military command. The article was prepared as a part o f grant: 
The Aegean Islands 8th-4th c. BC -  4th c. AD. Centre or Periphery o f  the Greek World. Project ID: 
2012/07/B/HS3/03455.
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The years between the Corinthian War and the Boeotian War (387-378) were a time of 
relative quiet in Greece, so rare in the 4th century.1 After the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6), 
Sparta managed to maintain the status of the most powerful polis. It had the land forces 
of the Peloponnesian League at its disposal, which gave it an unquestionable advan­
tage over potential opponents. The campaigns of the 380s against Mantinea, Phlius, and 
Olynthus, as well as the occupation of Thebes, meant that the Spartan arche seemed to 
be very well established in the Greek world.2 All of this went to waste as a result of the 
next conflict, during which the famous Battle of Leuctra was fought, usually regarded as 
the symbolic end of the Spartan hegemony. However, a considerable number of earlier
1 Buckler 2003, 178-180.
2 Sinclair 1978, 37-38; Seager 1994, 156-157; Kulesza 2003, 274-277; Rhodes 2009, 223-224, 245­
246.
Wo j c i e c h  Du s z y ń s k i66
battles took place in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, where Sparta’s opponent was Athens, 
which was actively expanding the Second Athenian Confederacy at that time.
Historians have devoted a great deal of attention to the Spartan policy towards the 
Aegean Islands in the early period, directly after the defeat of Athens in 404 and during 
the Corinthian War.3 However, the period after the Peace of Antalcidas has only rarely 
been studied.4 The reason for this is undoubtedly the extremely meagre amount of source 
materials. Therefore, the question arises whether this should be interpreted as a sign of 
Sparta practically abandoning an active maritime policy after 386. This view certainly 
has a solid basis and is accepted by many scholars. There are, however, mentions which 
indicate the opposite.
The account of Diodorus of Sicily is of fundamental importance for our knowledge 
about the beginnings of the Second Athenian Confederacy, although it is not free from 
controversy. He mentions the island states of Chios, Mitylene, Methymna on Lesbos, 
and Rhodes as thepoleis which left Sparta and joined the Athenians.5 However, it is dif­
ficult to accept without reservations that these members of the Second Athenian Confed­
eracy had been Sparta’s allies just a short time before joining the league. Other sources 
also seem to contradict this. For example, Chios had signed a separate, bilateral defence 
treaty with Athens in 384/3.6 Isocrates, in turn, mentions Chios, Mitylene and Byzantium 
as the states which still maintained good relations with Athens during the signing of the 
King’s Peace (387/6).7
What is very significant in the context of our reflections is the declaration included 
in the Decree of Aristotle, which, it is accepted, is the basis of the agreement forming 
the new league. It says that the Lacedaemonians should leave the Greeks free and au­
tonomous (orcœç av AaKe8[ai^ô]vioi éœoi xoç "EAlnvaç éXeu0é[p]oç [Kai] aùxovô^oç).8 
Therefore, the member states evidently regarded Sparta as a significant threat to their 
sovereignty. The islanders’ fears should have had some bases, which may have resulted 
from Sparta’s actual behaviour at the time. The fears must have been strong enough for 
individual states to be ready to tie themselves politically to Athens, despite the undoubt­
edly bad reputation of their previous symmachia.
It is worth noting here that the moment of signing the treaty between Athens and 
Chios coincided with the initial period of Sparta’s increased interference in the internal 
affairs of the individual poleis : after the attack on Mantinea (385), and before the aggres­
sion against Thebes (382), Olynthus (382-379), or Phlius (379). In all the instances apart 
from Olynthus they were landlocked cities. When Chios entered into an agreement with 
Athens in 384, therefore, it did not have to have serious fears about these Spartan ac­
tions. We can consequently surmise that they were caused by some other Spartan moves 
around the mid-380s.
3 E.g. Accame 1951, 96-97, 142-147; Hamilton 1979, 292-298, 302-311; Fornis 2008, 238-244, 263­
268.
4 Parke 1930; Seager 1974; Sinclair 1978.
5 Diod. 15.28.3.
6 IG II2, 34-35.
7 Isoc. 14.27-28. See Accame 1941, 32-37; Hamilton 1979, 179; Stylianou 1998, 252-253.
8 IG II2, 43, ll. 9-10.
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Let us try to identify the reasons behind the fears of the inhabitants of the Aegean 
Islands. First of all, they may have been related to the fact that Sparta maintained a navy, 
which was a key means of military pressure. However, the issue remains problematic 
due to a lack of mentions in the sources about using ships in the period between the 
armed conflicts. Sparta’s use of vessels is not attested prior to the Boeotian War (379­
371). During the war, the first instance of the Lacedaemonian fleet being used on a large 
scale was in the Battle of Naxos (376). Xenophon mentions in this context that prior to 
the whole campaign of 376, the Spartans had to gather the ships from the beginning, 
which clearly suggests that they did not have an organised fleet at their disposal at that 
moment.9 Therefore, there are good reasons to conclude that the fleet was disbanded 
after the King’s Peace was signed.10 On the other hand, the same author clearly suggests 
that Sparta already owned vessels in 377; he describes Thebes, which was suffering 
from a shortage of food, attempting to bring in corn by sea from Thessaly. This was 
prevented by Alcetas, a Spartan harmost who was staying in the city of Oreus in the 
north of Euboea. He intercepted a transport of Theban supplies using the triremes at his 
disposal. Rather paradoxically, this success was the beginning of Alcetas’ demise. As 
a result of a coincidence, the prisoners captured during the expedition managed to break 
free and killed the harmost, and the city took the side of Sparta’s opponents.11 Xenophon 
emphasises the fact that Alcetas secretly manned the triremes while the Thebans were 
busy with their purchase. This is connected with a stratagem attributed to the Spartiate by 
Polyainos and Frontinus.12 In order to make it more difficult for the enemy to find out the 
size of his forces at Oreus, the harmost trained his seamen using only one of his vessels. 
This ploy probably resulted from the wish to hide his advantage from the opponent, who, 
according to Xenophon, had only two triremes.
The account of Diodorus Siculus is an important piece of our picture of this situation. 
The historian mentions Oreus’ pro-Spartan attitude while describing the activities of the 
Athenian strategos Chabrias on Euboea (377). The otherpoleis on the island reportedly 
all took the side of Athens, and joined the emerging Second Athenian Confederacy.13 
The exception was Oreus, which had been helped by Sparta through its commander, 
Therippides, in getting rid of the local tyrant, Neogenes.14 Faced with resistance, Chabri- 
as plundered the territory of Oreus/Histiaea (the two names are used interchangeably 
by the author) and fortified a hill called Metropolis, where he left a garrison, and then 
sailed off towards the islands, which he won over to the Athenian side.15 The most natural 
time to place the events described by Diodorus seems to be between those included in
9 Xen., Hell. 5.4.60-61.
10 Sinclair 1978, 45; Cartledge 1987, 303-304.
11 Xen., loc. cit. Hell. V.4.56-57.
12 Front., Strat. 4.5.19; Polyaen., 2.7.1. Only the Latin author specifies the circumstances.
13 Diod. 15.30. 1. There is a mention in Plutarch (De glor. Athen. 350f) of Timotheos liberating Euboea. 
If this is true, then it should probably be connected with the information in Diodorus about his appointment as 
strategos in 378 (Diod. 15.29). Additionally, a separate inscription on Euboea’s acceptance to the Confederacy 
has survived (IG II2, 44). See Rhodes 2009, 269.
14 Diod. 15.30.1; 3-4. According to him, Neogenes captured power with the help of Jason of Pherae. For 
the policy of the Thessalian king in this context, see Sprawski 1999, 65-67.
15 Diod. 15.30.5. With regard to Metropolis, the location of this name on Euboea is also mentioned by 
Stephanus Byzantinus (s.v. Metropolis), although he gives no details.
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Xenophon’s account. Therefore, Alcetas became a harmost after the defeat of Neogenes 
with Therippides’ help and was killed after the departure of Chabrias, who landed on the 
island in 377.16 Histiaea joined the Second Athenian Confederacy before 376.17
Despite its unfortunate ending, the entire episode shows that the Lacedaemonians 
were already using vessels at the beginning of the Boeotian War, prior to the Battle of 
Naxos. The ships’ origin remains an open question; Alcetas’ triremes may have been 
built and manned in Laconia or later, on Euboea. The latter option is, however, clearly 
suggested by Xenophon using the verb nk^pórn in his narration with regard to Alcetas’ 
activities (LSJ: to man ships).18 Similarly, it is unknown to what extent the harmost’s 
activities were the effect of his initiative and to what extent they were the result of orders 
he received from his authorities. However, the latter certainly thought it advisable to 
maintain a constant presence on the faraway island. It is unlikely that the reason for this 
was anything other than the wish to control the shipping lane due to the very strategic 
location of Oreos.19 What is also significant is that Alcetas was not the first (probably the 
second) harmost in this city; therefore the effort to create and maintain the outpost on 
Euboea must have already been made by Sparta. There is a hypothesis which identifies 
Therippides (and we know of no other man of this name) with Herippidas (who we are 
familiar with), the commander of a Spartan garrison in Thebes, who capitulated when 
he was besieged by rebels in 379. If  this theory is correct, the beginning of the Spartan 
intervention should be dated to the same year. The problem is that the information about 
his participation in the Theban events comes only from Plutarch, who was a much later 
author. What is even more problematic is the fact that the fragment of the text which is 
of key importance to us is damaged, and the Spartiate’s name is the result of an emenda­
tion by the contemporary editor,20 which makes it difficult to form a definitive opinion 
on the matter.
The Spartan fleet therefore existed in some shape or form prior to 376, but the ques­
tion about its strength remains an open one. What may be helpful here is to reflect on the 
time it took to assemble the forces fighting at Naxos (ca. 60-65 vessels).21 We know from 
Xenophon that in the early spring of 376 Sparta was involved in ground operations. It 
was then that Cleombrotus’ unsuccessful attempt to attack Boeotia took place.22 Only af­
ter this fiasco, as a result of the insistence of their allies, did the Spartans decide to put up 
ships in order to block the inflow of provisions to Athens.23 However, the author does not 
specify how much time passed between taking and executing the decision. On the other 
hand, we know the exact date of the Battle of Naxos: the 16th day of the Attic month of
16 This hypothesis is accepted by Seager (1994, 172-173), Stylianou (1998, 279-280), and Buckler 
(2003, 243-245) among others. For the general chronology of the events, including different theories and 
their criticism, see Sprawski 1998, 54-56; 1999, 65-66.
17 IG II2, 43, l. 114. See Cargill 1981, 37; Buckler 2003, 245.
18 Xen. Hell, 5.4.56.
19 Sprawski 1999, 63-64; Buckler 2003, 243.
20 For the whole theory, see Parke 1927, 159-163.
21 Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.61) estimates the number of the Spartan symmachia’s vessels put up for the 
376 campaign to be 60 ships. Diodorus, on the other hand (15.34.5.), writes that at Naxos alone it had 65 
triremes at its disposal.
22 Xen., Hell. 5.4.59.
23 Xen., Hell. 5.4.60.
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boedromion, i.e. the month bridging September and October.24 It would therefore seem 
that assembling a fleet of considerable size progressed rather efficiently. This may sug­
gest that they already had vessels, which needed to be gathered together. However, if 
Sparta had quite numerous triremes, then why do we know so little about them?
An analysis of Sparta’s next naval activities may provide an answer to the above 
question. After the defeat at Naxos, the Peloponnesian League twice (at Alysia in 375 
and during the attack against Korkyra in 373) sent fleets of a similar size of around 
60 vessels, but it must be remembered that each time the member states contributed. 
In the case of Mnasippos’ unsuccessful expedition to Korkyra (373), Xenophon men­
tions eleven states which supplied the triremes.25 The explanation for the problem of the 
Spartan fleet may be in the number of the states involved in putting it up. Most likely the 
Spartans had some, not very numerous, vessels, which they also kept during peacetime, 
and so did their allies. This was completely sufficient in order to assemble a considerable 
number by the joined forces. Crucially, the economic burden of the individual cities was 
not too high in such a case.
At this point, it is worth making a comparison with the earlier conflicts. Thucydides, 
describing the plans to build a Peloponnesian fleet in 413, writes that Sparta was to put 
up 25 vessels out of the total of one hundred.26 Naturally, the fleets of the symmachia 
from the times of the Peloponnesian War were much larger. After the Battle of Knidos 
(394), the number of vessels decreases considerably. In 387, Antalcidas gathered over 
80 triremes in Hellespont, including the 20 sent by Dionysus the Elder from Sicily. Out 
of the remaining 60, some were provided by the Persians, and some captured from the 
Athenians.27 It is therefore easy to estimate the actual contribution of Sparta and its allies 
from the Peloponnesian League at 60 or fewer vessels. In order to put up a larger fleet it 
was necessary to obtain external support, preferably from Persia, which was evidently 
missing after the Peace of Antalcidas.
Let us now move on to an analysis of possible mentions in the sources about the Spar­
tan policy concerning the Aegean Islands. An inscription from Thasos has survived to 
our times, which gives contemporary historians some grounds to conclude that a Spartan 
intervention took place there. We cannot be certain, however, because the text only men­
tions that Athens gave privileges (ateleia) to people exiled from Thasos on the charge 
of philo-Athenian sympathies.28 Naturally, the exile must have been executed by the 
authorities, which were decisively anti-Athenian, and therefore presumably pro-Spartan. 
Demosthenes also seems to address the matter in his speech against Leptines, mention­
ing the privileges given by the Athenians to the exiles from Thasos.29 However, the exile 
itself was not necessarily related to a Spartan intervention. It may have been the initiative 
of the citizens of Thasos, at most inspired by Sparta. The latter option is even more prob­
able on the basis of the silence of the sources about any military intervention. Placing
24 Plutarch gives the dating in several places (Phoc. 6.1.3; Camill. 19.3; deglor. Ath. 349f) and Polyaenus 
(3. 11.2.).
25 Xen., Hell. 6.2.
26 Thuc. 8.3.2.
27 Xen., Hell. 5.1.28.
28 IG II2, 33.
29 Dem. 20.61.
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the episode in time is also problematic, because neither of the mentioned sources gives 
information about it. Some clues are provided by a mention in the inscription about the 
Mantineans, who had received analogous privileges in Athens. It is usually assumed that 
they were people exiled from Mantinea after 385.30
At this point we need to address the issue of our general knowledge about the his­
tory of the island. After the Peloponnesian War it obviously came under the influence of 
Sparta, but Thrasybulus’ efforts led to the Lacedaemonian garrison being removed and 
an alliance with Athens being signed in 389/8.31 We also know that Thasos joined the 
Second Athenian Confederacy ca. 375, i.e. relatively late.32 The question that therefore 
arises is what happened in the period between those two events. It is possible that Thasos 
underwent a political re-orientation towards Sparta at that time. The consequence of this 
would have been the exile of the people mentioned in the inscription in question. Some 
historians, however, completely reject this possibility. They argue both the inscription 
and Demosthenes’ mention refer to the much earlier events of 408, when we hear about 
fighting on the island and about Thasos joining an alliance with the Lacedaemonians. In 
their opinion, what supports this theory is especially a lack of clear information about the 
events on the island in the mid-80s and prosopographical factors.33 They draw attention 
to the fact that Xenophon refers to the outlaws from Mantinea in 385 as the argolid- 
zontes, which suggests Argos, not Athens, as the final destination where they sought 
shelter.34 According to them, the reference to the Mantineans in the inscription concerns 
the people exiled from the polis after the events of 418.35 This theory, however, is even 
more problematic, because we read nothing about an exile from Mantinea in this period. 
Moreover, Xenophon is in fact silent on the subject of the place to which his argolid- 
zontes from 385 headed. There is, therefore, no reason not to assume that it was Athens. 
The mention about the exiles from Thasos who were going to obtain the same ateleia as 
the Mantineans does seem to fit the mid-380s quite well.
More information about the Spartan policy concerning the islands may come from 
Isocrates. In Panegyricus he very enigmatically mentions the disputes between the Spar­
tans and the Athenians about the Cyclades.36 The narration uses the present tense, which 
may suggest that the author is referring to a specific, current situation (i.e. ca. 380). 
However, Panegyricus presents the general character of the Athenian-Spartan relations. 
One example is a passage about an armed confrontation between the two states, even 
though they were at peace at the time.37 It is therefore difficult to say definitively whether 
Isocrates only meant the current state of affairs. It is equally possible that the fragment 
about the islands refers to slightly earlier events, e.g. from the times of the Corinthian 
War. Some historians formed the hypothesis that Isocrates is referring here to the alleged 
dispute about the island of Delos. In 393/2 it found itself under the Athenian domination,
30 IG II2, 33, ll. 7-8. See Osborne 1981, 48-57.
31 Xen., Hell. 5.1.7; Dem. 20.59; IG II2, 24.
32 Cargill 1981, 37, 42.
33 E.g. Pouiloux 1954, 194-203.
34 Xen., Hell. 5.2.6.
35 Pouiloux 1954, 194-195.
36 Isoc. 4.136: àXXà rcepi gèv xräv KuK^äSrav vt|arav ag^iaßnxoügev.
37 Isoc. 4.133: [...] oï xiveç obxra rcepi giKprâv KivSuvebogev.
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and after the King’s Peace it was to regain independence. Suspicions of a conflict about 
Delos are based on an analysis of epigraphic material related to the management of the 
local sanctuary.38 However, the evaluation of the changes in the local administrative 
customs is far from clear, and it cannot be ruled out that the Athenians may also have 
maintained their influence in the sanctuary after the King’s Peace was signed.39 Most 
importantly, even if they were indeed removed, this need not have been connected with 
a Spartan intervention, which is not mentioned by any source. Therefore connecting De­
los to the mentioned enigmatic remark in Isocrates (which does not necessarily concern 
the situation in the 380s) remains an assumption based on very weak foundations.
Further information about the Spartan policy concerning the Aegean Islands in 387­
378 can be searched for in the sources covering the period of the Boeotian War. In 376, 
immediately before the Battle of Naxos, the Spartan fleet operated from the region of 
Aegina, Keos, and Andros, but it is difficult to say whether it had permanent bases in 
these places, with the exception of the first one. Xenophon writes enigmatically about 
the Lacedaemonian fleet literally being in the vicinity of Aegina, Keos, and Andros (rov 
vauiiKov ovrnç rov AaKeôaipovimv nepi re Aiyivav Kai Kern Kai Âvôpov.).40 The author 
also later mentions that Aegina was used for launching raids against Attica, but says 
nothing about the other two islands. This either indicates that the Spartans were repelled 
from Keos and Andros (attested in the 370s as members of the Second Athenian Confed­
eration), or that their presence there was not constant.41 Polyaenus describes the manoeu­
vre employed by the Athenian strategos Diotimos, who was escorting a supply of grains 
when he was attacked by the Lacedaemonian triremes near Chios.42 The incident can 
be connected with the period of the Boeotian War.43 Considering the distance (less than 
100 kilometres), it seems perfectly plausible that vessels operating from Andros were 
able to reach the eastern parts of Chios.44
According to Diodorus, after the campaign on Euboea in 377 Chabrias headed to 
the Aegean Sea, where he secured for his homeland Peparethos, Skiathos, and some 
unspecified islands. Previously (i.e. before the outbreak of the conflict between Athens
38 See Beloch 1922, 144; Parke 1930, 73; Sinclair 1978, 43-44. In 385-377/376 we can observe a lack 
of customary dedications of Athenian Amphictyons, put up in the sanctuary during festivals celebrated every 
four years. It is frequently accepted that those festivals were held in the periods when the island was under 
the Athenian control. Therefore, after the King’s Peace the island fell out of the Athenian sphere of influence 
until 377/376.
39 As V. Chankowski (2008, 202-219) shows, in the case of Delos we cannot speak of any regularity 
which would enable us to draw conclusions about the political situation on the island.
40 Xen., Hell. 5.4.61.
41 Stylianou (1998, 307) and Buckler (2003, 247) believe that the Spartans had bases in these locations. 
Cartledge (1987, 304) is of a different opinion; according to him Andros and Keos already belonged to the 
Second Athenian Confederacy at that time.
42 Polyaen. 5.22.1.
43 Diotimos is attested during this conflict in an extant dedication from a statue of Chabrias, erected after 
the victory at Naxos. See Burnett/Edmonson 1961, 79-81.
44 On the basis of information preserved in ancient literature it is known that a military vessel could 
travel ca. 260 km during a “long day” (Xen., An. 7.37), and in extreme cases it was even possible to cover 
a distance of up to 350 km over 24 hours (Thuc. 3.49.3.). See Morrison/Williams 1968, 209; Casson 1995, 
293-295.
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and Sparta) they had supposedly been subordinated by the Spartans.45 No other source 
confirms Diodorus’ account, although some historians connect the information about the 
Spartan control over the islands with the activity of Therippides (Herippidas?) and Al- 
cetas.46 Assuming that this information is correct, the Spartans must have taken specific 
steps in order to build footholds near the Thessalian coastline. Diodorus also mentions 
that before the Battle of Naxos the Athenians besieged the city. This indicates the pro- 
Spartan orientation of this island as well, which is directly stated in the scholion to the 
Panathenaic oration.47 The sea battle did not come to pass as a result of Sparta coming 
to Naxos’ rescue. This clearly shows that the island must have been of great importance 
to them.
It seems, therefore, that around 379 Sparta had a number of friendly or subordinated 
island states which formed a sort of cordon along the eastern coast of continental Greece, 
including Thasos, Histiaea, Peparethos, Skiathos, Andros, Keos, Aegina and Naxos. 
Sparta also controlled Olynthus and the entire Chalkidiki Peninsula, subordinated as 
a result of a campaign conducted in 382-379.48 In the majority of cases the distances 
between the cities closest to each other did not exceed the daily reach of a trireme (the 
longest stretch between Andros and Skiathos is ca. 200 km). This does not mean that 
Sparta maintained permanent manned bases in all these locations. The available sources 
are all silent on this subject, which is not surprising in the light of the terms of the King’s 
Peace concerning the autonomy of the individual poleis.49 The only exception is Histiaea, 
which was manned only at the time of the outbreak of the Boeotian War. It was later, in 
376, that forces were introduced on Aegina, and probably Keos and Andros.
An analysis of Sparta’s attested (or likely) interventions in 387-379 reveals some in­
terest in the northern part of the Aegean Sea and the Thracian coast. It was a continuation 
of the earlier policy, starting from the Peloponnesian War (Brasidas’ campaigns).50 In the 
early 370s, on the brink of the conflict with Athens, efforts were made to increase the 
Spartan influence in the area of northern Euboea. Spartan actions may, therefore, have 
resulted from the wish to strengthen their own position in the region before the outbreak 
of the next war.
An analysis of the later strategy adopted in the confrontation against Athens in 378­
375 can also lead to some interesting conclusions concerning the Lacedaemonian foot­
holds on the Aegean Islands. Initially, the Spartans’ top priority was to defeat Thebes. 
Only after they failed to do so did they decide to shift the majority of their efforts to 
a different front. According to Xenophon they were persuaded by the allies’ demands, 
drawing their attention to how easily Athens could be blockaded from the sea and con­
sequently starved into submission.51 The concept of forcing the opponent to submit 
through attacking their grain supplies was a practical copy of the earlier Peloponnesian
45 Diod. 15.30.5.
46 Sinclair 1978, 46.
47 Diod. 15.34.4; scholia Panath. 173.16 (p. 282): anv vauai rcoXiopKrâv Nàcjov Xaßprät;, AaKeSai^ovüav 
oùaav an^axov.
48 Rhodes 2009, 246-247.
49 Xen., Hell. 5.1.30; Diod. 14.110.3.
50 Rhodes 2009, 126-128.
51 Xen., Hell. 5.4.60.
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and Corinthian wars, during which it had proved to be a successful strategy. At that time, 
however, it had been executed in more distant Hellespont, which was easily the best 
place to cut Athens off from its critically important supplies. Theoretically, a single men­
tion in Polyaenus can be linked with the Boeotian War. He mentions the Spartan com­
mander Ischolaos being besieged by Chabrias in the Thracian city of Drys.52 The episode 
is frequently linked with the Boeotian War, even though the author does not provide any 
information that might make dating possible.53 It is equally possible that these events 
happened during the Corinthian War. This is much more convincing, if  only because of 
Sparta’s activity in the region, which is attested by other sources.54 Chabrias’ presence 
in Thrace in ca. 390 is also documented, in an inscription about an agreement with the 
Thracian King Seuthes.55
It remains an interesting question why the blockade in 376 was attempted relatively 
close to the coast of Attica, in much less advantageous conditions. Considering their 
earlier experience, the Spartan decision should not be explained away with just a lack 
of awareness of geostrategic conditions, especially since the person largely responsible 
for the success during the Corinthian conflict, Antalcidas, was still alive. Even so, we 
have practically no information suggesting that the Spartans attempted to blockage Hel­
lespont. There must have been specific reasons for choosing to form the blockade near 
Attica.
It seems that in the period prior to the confrontations with the Athenians Sparta must 
have been considerably weakened in terms of logistics, mainly with regard to the avail­
ability of the advance bases from which the fleet could operate. It is most likely that 
the Lacedaemonians no longer had these in 376. This is odd in the light of the earlier 
analysis, which suggests that they should have had at their disposal at least a few friendly 
places from which their fleet could potentially operate. Although they were too distant 
for the blockade of Hellespont, they may have been the basis of a further offensive di­
rected against the Black Sea Straits. Therefore, these positions must probably have been 
lost by Sparta earlier. It seems that the key period was the first two years of the conflict 
with Athens (378-376), when Sparta was not very involved at sea. During this period, the 
opponents carried out a large-scale diplomatic and military offensive, during which they 
won many allies. The aforementioned poleis tied to Sparta, seeing its passivity, gradu­
ally joined the other side one by one. In 376, the extent of the Lacedaemonian influence 
probably shrank to include Aegina, Keos, and Andros. As a result, operating in the north 
of the Aegean Sea became impossible. Although Spartan supporters managed to stay in 
power in Histiaea/Oreos, they did so only in the short term, because the city joined the 
Second Athenian Confederation prior to 375. After the Battle of Naxos, Keos and Andros 
also became members of the Confederation.56 Thasos and Olynthus with Chalkidiki are
52 Polyaen. 2.22.3.
53 Kirchner 1899, 2019; Welwei 1998; Bianco 2001, 58.
54 Parke 1930, 61, note 50. The information that Drys was supposedly only founded by Iphicrates (see 
Rehdantz 1845, 64) seems untrue (Pritchett 1974, 67).
55 IG II2, 21.
56 Cargill 1981, 61.
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also attested as members of the Second Athenian Confederation.57 Combined with the 
earlier alliances and the possession of Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros (guaranteed by the 
King’s Peace), this meant that the Athenians had virtually full control of the lanes to the 
straits. The only ally which remained on Sparta’s side was probably Aegina.
What is interesting in this context are the conclusions of many historians concerning 
the internal divisions of the Spartan elites, resulting from different conceptions of con­
ducting foreign policy. A hypothesis has been put forward that Sphodrias’ famous march 
in 378, which led to the outbreak of an open war with Athens, was a provocation of the 
party connected with King Cleombrotus.58 The party supposedly derived from a group 
of followers of the deceased Lysander, who supported sea expansion and maintaining 
Spartan influence in the Aegean Sea region. For that reason, the party was interested in 
a war against Athens rather than Thebes, and was opposed to the “continental” policy 
promoted by Agesilaos. In my opinion, however, the history of the conflict shows that 
even if such a party did exist, it had limited opportunities to implement its conception. 
During the first years of the conflict with Athens, Sparta did not undertake any specific 
action in the Aegean Sea aimed against the Athenians. The war at sea was treated as be­
ing of clearly secondary importance in comparison to the struggle on land, and as a result 
Sparta gave some footholds up without a fight and worsened its own position.
There is one more fundamental factor of the struggle in the 370s which should be 
taken into consideration in our reflections on the Spartan naval policy. In the previ­
ous two wars, the Athenian fleet was either neutralised before the blockade of Piraeus 
(Aegospotami in 405) or was in the clear minority (Antalcidas in Hellespont in 387). In 
376 there was evidently an attempt to blockade Athens without winning a clear naval 
advantage first. Both Xenophon and Diodorus, in the already cited passages, clearly 
state that the forces of the Peloponnesian League wanted to immediately cut off grain 
supplies, in a way without taking into consideration the possibility of an Athenian ac­
tion. Especially in Xenophon, the mention about the Peloponnesians’ dismissive attitude 
towards the capability of the Athenian fleet is curious. In the quoted debate before the 
naval campaign of 376, there is a phrase about being able to gather a much larger fleet 
than the Athenians (é^eîvat yàp a ^ a t  vaùç rcXppœaavxaç rcoXn rcXaouç xœv AOpvrnrav), 
which is followed by the possibility of starving the opponents into defeat, without any 
reference to a prospective battle.59 This gives the impression that the Spartans and their
57 Both locations are present on the Decree of Aristoteles stele (IG II2, 43, ll. 101-102; Olynthus with the 
Chalkidikian League and l. 100 in the case of Thasos). In both cases the damaged text is reconstructed, but 
the reconstruction is certain. See Cargill 1981, 42-43.
58 The matter of Sphodrias’ trial and acquittal: Xen., Hell. 5.4.24-34; Diod. 15.29.6-7. The issue of the 
harmost’s motives is problematic in this context. Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.20) and Plutarch (Plut., Pelop. 14) 
suggest that Sphodrias was supposedly bribed by the Thebans in order to provoke Athens into a war against 
Sparta. Diodorus (15.29.5), on the other hand, makes King Cleombrotus out to be the cause of the trouble. 
Scholars assume assume that Sphodrias acted on his own initiative -  see Marshall (1905, 12); Munn (1993, 
145-146). His goal was to “shake up” Athens and to make it pursue a more lenient policy with regard to 
Sparta. Cargill (1981, 59) is for the Theban bribery. Buck (1994, 93) argues for the Thebans’ instigation aimed 
at persuading the Spartans to temporarily empty Thespiae of the garrison, which would make an assault on 
the exposed city possible. Cawkwell (1973, 55), Stylianou (1998, 263-264), and Buckler (2003, 221-222) 
subscribe to Cleombrotus’ inspiration.
59 Xen., Hell. 5.4.60.
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allies counted on immediately pushing the Athenians into deep defensive. The reality 
threw cold water on those expectations. Even without their allies from the Second Athe­
nian Confederation, the Athenians had 83 triremes against the opponents’ approximate 
60 at Naxos.60 Underestimating the opponent’s potential may suggest that the Spartans 
started their far-flung efforts without a considered plan and with poor knowledge of the 
opponent’s capability. Everything indicates that they showed little interest in an active 
naval policy in the preceding period.
In the context of the above reflections, the Spartan naval policy concerning the Aege­
an Islands in 387-378 can be described as inconsistent. The divisions among the Spartan 
elites postulated by historians seem to be a good explanation of the reason for that. In 
the light of Xenophon’s account it also seems that the Spartans considerably underesti­
mated the Athenians’ potential, assuming they would easily win control of the sea. This 
may be a reflection on the quality of the entire Spartan political and military leadership, 
whose members most likely completely failed the test, regardless of which faction they 
belonged to.
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